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Grasslands are an important ecological and economic resource in the United
States. As part of a natural system, these landscapes can provide income for ranching
operations and employment in rural communities; habitat for grassland plants, animals,
and migratory species; and offer other services not always readily observed such as
improved soil health, clean water, and carbon sequestration. Despite the overarching
benefits, the conversion of grasslands to other uses remains widespread throughout much
of the remaining Great Plains ecosystem.
Shifting from livestock ranching to another land use often reflects a tipping point.
This occurs when the alternative land use is perceived to outweigh the risks and losses
stemming from grassland conversion. Large areas of grasslands are privately owned in
the US, but many of the benefits that are provided are nontraditional public goods. The
conversion of naturally functioning landscapes can be ecologically disruptive and come
at a detriment to both private and public interests. Alternative marketing opportunities
and revitalized conservation efforts may be necessary to create linkages between private
land management and the supply of services from healthy grassland ecosystems.
Using Nebraska’s statewide wildlife management plan as a guide, we developed a
hypothetical grassland ecosystem services market and tested the programmatic

preferences of ranchers who would sell the services produced from their lands. In testing
attributes related to management, contract length, and payment level, we found that
ranchers indicated strong preferences for the types of management actions that were
incentivized and not the accompanying contract length or payment. This research
contributes to conservation literature in the areas of conjoint choice experiments and
incomplete confounded factorial experimental design. It may also have utility in the form
of market research for the future piloting of ecosystem services programs.
Keywords: payment for ecosystem services; human-centered design; ranching; grassland
conservation programs

“While conservation actions in the past have had notable successes, they have not
been sufficient to stem the overall tide of species decline. There is a need for a
comprehensive, systematic, and proactive approach to conserving the full array of
Nebraska’s biological diversity.”
- Nebraska Natural Legacy Project, 2011
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Background
Grasslands are considered one of the most widespread, most imperiled, and least
protected vegetation types on earth (Hoekstra, et al., 2005; Lipsey et al., 2015). Because
of their productivity—often resulting from centuries of natural and pastoral
interactions—these areas have long been a prominent target for conversion to agriculture
(Samson & Knopf, 1994; Hoekstra et al., 2005). As climatic conditions shift and the
demands for food, fuel, and fiber increase with the global population, it should be
expected that grasslands continue to be among the world’s most altered and least
protected ecosystems (Wright & Wimberly, 2013).
According to Rashford et al. (2011), converting native grasslands to other uses
(i.e., cultivated cropland) is “historically extensive and continues worldwide today” (p.
277). In the US, the development of the Great Plains grasslands was borne out of
economics and farm policy sown in the 1870s (Samson & Knopf, 1994). In the century
that followed, Claassen et al. (2012) suggest that an estimated 260 million acres of the
region’s 550 million acres of native grasslands were upturned. Today, estimates suggest
North American grasslands only cover 40% of the historical range (Wilsey et al., 2019).
In the last twenty years, dramatic price swings in crop commodities have further
increased grassland losses in the US. A precise accounting remains elusive—due to
decentralized approaches in cataloging cropland (Joshi et al., 2019). However, an
analysis by Claassen, et al. (2012) suggests the entire Northern Great Plains (NGP)—
about 18% of all domestic grassland acres—accounted for 57% of the gross domestic
grassland to cropland conversion from 1997-2007. In the last ten years, following historic
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commodity price increases, other studies in this region suggest that an average of 1-5% of
NGP grasslands are converted every year (Claassen et al., 2012; Wright & Wimberly,
2013; Gage et al., 2016).
While the record-high commodity prices have subsided, Lark et al. (2020) suggest
the threat to grasslands persists. Their recent analysis, examining conversion trends
during and after the 2007-2012 commodity price booms, indicates the total rate of
converted acres did fall following the 2011-2012 peak. However, the gross conversion
rate stabilized near 1 million acres per year for several years thereafter. Further, the
researchers suggest, due to a lack of other suitable lands for conversion, longstanding
habitat or land that was categorized as agriculturally marginal was brought into
production. Overall, the highest rates of loss of “natural landcover” occurred in the
western corn belt and western Great Plains—the leading edge of westward land-use
conversion (Olimb & Robinson, 2019).
Western grasslands in the US are arguably the last remaining vestige of the Great
Plains, and cattle ranching has been its principal use for decades (Fleischner, 1994).
However, this dynamic has changed rapidly since the 2000s. Economic conditions in
agriculture, trends in urbanization, and energy development—as well as demographic and
normative trends in ranching communities—are pushing these remaining grasslands and
associated natural communities to a breaking point (Goldstein et al., 2011). To what
extent policy should be used as an intervention tool appears to be a moving target for
policymakers, conservation managers, and agricultural producers.
Grasslands embody America’s ancestral and modern agricultural identity. These
areas are steadfastly revered and create emotional connections to the landscape that often
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permeate through generations (Gutwein & Goldstein, 2013; Havstad et al., 2007; Gentner
& Tanaka, 2002). With the pressures from cropland conversion, urbanization, energy
development, and woody encroachment on the rise, these grasslands future as the “Great
Plains” is uncertain. If the array of benefits grasslands offer is to be maintained, a shift in
conservation strategies and scale is urgently needed to address the growing needs of
ranchers, rural economies, and wildlife populations (Krausman et al., 2009).
Complexities in Land-use Conversion
The issues surrounding grassland conversion are complex and interconnected, but
not unfamiliar. Profitability, suburban population expansion, energy development, and an
aging workforce are commonly cited as drivers of land-use conversion (Goldstein, 2011).
Technological innovations in equipment, seed genetics, agrichemicals, and irrigation
systems are also principal factors as intensive agriculture expands into marginally
productive regions (Claassen et al., 2012). Shifts in climate and weather are also aiding
row-crop expansion as areas previously deemed unsuitable are targeted for production
(Reitsma et al., 2015). Several analyses (Rashford et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2017; Lark et
al., 2019) have detected linkages to federal policy—predominantly crop insurance—as a
multiplier effect, thus increasing motivations to convert grasslands.
The historic row crop price increases in the early 2000s offer context. At that
time, federal crop subsidies for corn, wheat, and soybeans totaled $11.1 billion while
those for livestock grazing were $267 million (Environmental Working Group, 2005).
The subsidies provided a new risk aversion tactic that had otherwise been unavailable to
many farmers (US GAO, 2007; Miao et al., 2016). Claassen et al. (2012) explain that the
combination of subsidies (i.e., marketing loans, disaster assistance, and crop insurance)
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led to an additional 2.9% increase in total cropland acreage expansion during this period.
Bauman et al. (2014) also found that many of the subsidy programs during this timeframe
had inverse effects on enrollment in land conservation programs. These conditions helped
exacerbate typical grassland conversion rates according to Miao et al. (2016). The
researchers suggest that because subsidies effectively covered losses for cropping
previously unsuitable areas, some of the overall risks and cost of land conversion were
mitigated as part of a broader commodity safety net.
State and federal subsidization of biofuel industries are also driving motivations
to convert grasslands (Nash, 2007; Fargione et al., 2009; Wright & Wimberly, 2013).
During the initial buildout of the industry in the early 2000s, 4.2 million acres of
grasslands within 100-miles of these refineries helped fuel the demand for corn-based
ethanol (Wright et al. (2017). As production targets increased, semi-arid grasslands that
were highly unsuited for crop production were also converted to cropland and sustained
through increases in irrigation (Wright & Wimberly, 2013). The viability for crop-based
biofuels as a greener alternative to oil is diminishing as the high costs of land conversion,
water use, and reliance on fossil fuels are becoming realized (Ott et al., 2020). However,
Lark et al. (2015) suggest that the industry and policies surrounding have already
prompted “the greatest transformation to cropland since the ‘fencerow-to-fencerow’ era
of the 1970s” (p. 1).
The promise of higher returns from alternative land use is an important
consideration for someone in livestock ranching. But in totality, what are the sunken
costs of converting grasslands to other uses? Increases in soil erosion and decreases in
grassland-dependent species are widely recognized as side-effects of land-use conversion
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(Pimentel et al., 1995; Swengel & Swengel, 2015; Lipsey et al., 2015). There are also
concerns about the release of ancient carbon stores (Eve et al., 2002; Gascoigne et al.,
2011), impairment of water resources due to depletion and the introduction of
agrichemicals (Faber, et al., 2012), as well as the extirpation of soil life (Lipson & Kelly,
2014). If widespread grassland conversion continues across the remaining 770 million
acres of grasslands in the US (USDA, 2021c), a disruption in the delivery of some
ecosystem services at regional and national scales should be expected (Lark et al., 2020;
Gage et al., 2016).
Statement of the Problem
Why private landowners choose to engage in operational diversification or
outright land-use conversion is settled among researchers: it is complex. There are
economic motivators, but there are also technological advancements, personal norms, and
lifestyle amenities that may simultaneously be at play when operational decisions are
formulated (Kennedy et al., 2016; Gutwein & Goldstein, 2013; Claassen et al., 2012).
Regardless of the rationale, the interminable loss of environmental benefits is normally
expected because of the financial costs associated with landscape conversion and future
land restoration (Wachenheim & Lesch, 2014). Additionally, services such as carbon
sequestration (Eve et al., 2002), the building of organic matter, and recovery of the soil
biota can take decades to achieve (Gelfand et al., 2011), often with varying degrees of
success (Wang et al., 2017).
There is less consensus surrounding the most effective policy mechanism that can
address the steady decline of grasslands. With an annual budget of $5.7 billion (USDA
ERS, 2016), the USDA’s voluntary conservation programs are considered the premier
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resource for private lands conservation. However, research shows these programs are
more supportive of crop production and less conducive to incentivized conservation or
assurances of environmental quality (Smith et al., 2011; Lichtenberg, 2014; Claassen et
al, 2016). For example, despite record-high participation in 2007, the core suite of
conservation offerings were dramatically reduced in the ensuing Farm Bills. The question
of how to achieve increasing needs for long-term conservation alongside the shrinking
availability of programs adapted for the short-term is problematic.
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), one of the most widely recognized
voluntary conservation programs in the US, provides an interesting case study. Since
2007, legislative action has lowered acreage targets in each of the three subsequent Farm
Bills. This has resulted in landowner enrollment declines of more than 14 million acres
over the same period (USDA, 2021a). One programmatic counterpart, the Conservation
Stewardship Program, experienced an over two-thirds reduction in acres under contract
dropping from 20 million to 6.42 million since 2009 (USDA, 2021b). It has been
suggested that precipitous drops in acreage enrollment can exacerbate environmental
degradation, triggering net losses to habitat and associated wildlife (Lark et al., 2020).
This occurs as previously undisturbed, environmentally sensitive, or marginally
productive areas are brought into crop production because of a lack of suitable land-use
alternatives (Hendricks & Er, 2018).
Morefield et al., (2016) note changes in enrollment targets often coincide with the
expansion of cropland acres across the US. This reflects the origins of these programs as
supply management tools (Reichelderfer & Boggess, 1988), but even recent policy
updates mirror a legislative prioritization of production versus conservation (Hellerstein,
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2017). As incentives and enrollment opportunities have decreased, so too has landowner
interest in programs such as CRP (Osteen et al., 2012). According to Hendricks & Er
(2018), the effectiveness of using commodity price control mechanisms for land
conservation is questionable given enrollment caps are set years before the market
conditions are known. Given these trends, it may not be prudent to rely solely on federal
programs to achieve long-term, landscape-scale conservation of grasslands.
The compounding effects of farm policy, commodity prices, and a lack of suitable
land-use alternatives raise important questions about the current state and future design of
grassland conservation programs. How do we not only enhance the conservation of
grasslands but also safeguard the benefits that are provided at regional and national
scales? One alternative conservation framework that has emerged in the literature,
payment for ecosystem services (PES), notably shifts resources away from a narrow set
of management practices and redirects it toward landscape-level management of
ecosystem services (Engel et al., 2008).
Voluntary conservation programs are normally rooted in what Sorice and Donlan
(2015) suggest is a well-intentioned reaction to focus exclusively on the needs of
imperiled species. While this approach has been popular with incentivized programs of
the past (Dayer et al., 2018), it notably does not align with the needs, values, or abilities
of those tasked with the species’ recovery or protection effort (Donlan, 2015). The most
obvious implication becomes one of persistence: will the desired management activity
continue beyond the life of the incentive? An accounting of expiring CRP contacts from
2010-2013 in 12 Great Plains states would suggest not. Morefield et al. (2016) found a
near 30% return rate to intensive agriculture following contract expiration, and grasslands
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were the largest type of lands converted (360,000 ha). While the authors note reduced
enrollment targets and commodity prices helped propel this trend, the lack of returns for
taxpayer investment is problematic in the absence of behavioral persistence (Dayer et al.,
2018).
Sorice and Donlan (2015) further suggest that because voluntary conservation
program participation is “grounded by place, and occurs in different social, political,
cultural, and economic contexts” (p. 791), programs of the future should take proactive
measures to better account for participants’ rights, livelihoods, and values. While the
dynamics of conservation in agricultural landscapes are no doubt complex, successful
conservation efforts must produce cost-effective, long-term, and landscape-level impacts.
It is from this lens that we explore the foundation of a human-centered approach to
grassland ecosystem services conservation in the Great Plains.
Ecosystem services, broadly operationalized by Daily (1997) “are the conditions
and processes through which natural ecosystems, and the species that make them up,
sustain and fulfill human life” (p. 3). While this is no longer an innovation in
communicating the benefits of the naturally occurring systems, there are shortcomings in
incentivizing the conservation of the many services healthy grasslands provide. PES
programs aid this process by incorporating free-market enterprise with the supply of
services resulting from sustainable grassland management (Hansen et al., 2018).
Research Question
The research question posited in this quantitative analysis was: which
combination of contract attributes are most likely to lead to the participation of ranchers
in a grassland payment for ecosystem services program? A supplemental area of interest
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for our study pertained to the identification of lower-order interactions among
conservation management practices, payment levels, and contract lengths.
Significance of this Study
Federal subsidies and direct payments for conservation-orientated activities to
private landowners are not new, coming to the mainstream during the economic and
ecological turmoil of the 1930s. While there have been notable successes in the areas of
species and habitat protection, conservation efforts have largely been unsuccessful at
stopping overall species decline (Schneider et al., 2011). At a period when livestock
ranchers attempt to navigate rising input costs, thin profit margins, turbulent international
trade policy, and increasingly high property taxes, converting grasslands to other uses
may be the only plausible option for operations to remain profitable.
The decision to convert grasslands to row cropping systems is not a turnkey
financial strategy, it emphasizes relative prices and expected returns over many years
(Rashford et al. 2011; Miao et al., 2013). However, in the past 20 years, grassland
conversion has outpaced conservation and rivaled mass conversion events preceding the
Dust Bowl and those of the fencerow-to-fencerow era in the 1970s (Lark et al., 2015).
This study looks to PES programs as a framework to stabilize rancher revenues, enhance
conservation outcomes, maintain ecosystem services, and keep the remaining Great
Plains grasslands right side up.
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Definition of Terms
When introducing new programmatic or conceptual models, terminology and
frameworks are utilized to further the reader’s understanding of the scientific research or
industry practice. To assist in the clarity of this publication, commonly cited terms and
definitions from PES researchers are included here:
Biodiversity - The phenomenon of how organisms and their genetic differences interact
among ecological communities, landscapes, and ecosystems West (1993). Biodiversity
plays multiple roles in the delivery of ecosystem services (Mace, Norris, & Fitter, 2012).
Ecosystem services - A framework for analyzing relationships between humans and
nature. Specifically, according to Daily (1997), “…the conditions and processes through
which natural ecosystems, and the species that make them up, sustain and fulfill human
life.”
Grasslands - Land cover/use terminology applied interchangeably in reference to native
grasslands, tame seeded grass, rangelands, and associated habits (e.g., wetlands).
Heterogeneity - The complexity and/or variability of a system property in space and
or/time (Li & Reynolds, 1995).
Human-centered conservation design - An innovative solution to conservation issues that
incorporates empathy for participants, co-designing program approaches, and transfer
technology through rapid prototyping of program concepts (Sorice & Donlan, 2015).
Motivation crowding - Theory that suggests increases in prosocial behavior through
external incentives will fluctuate based on a ‘crowding-in’ or ‘crowding-out’ of intrinsic
motivations (Cranford & Mourato, 2014).
Nebraska Natural Legacy Project - Nebraska’s state wildlife management plan. This
planning document is required by the federal government in all states and revised at least
every ten years.
Payment for ecosystem services (PES) - A broad term used to describe emerging
environmental markets (Gutwein & Goldstein, 2013). PES programs are often viewed as
environmental subsidies, wherein a landowner receives a compensatory payment for
engaging in conservation activities on private lands (Hansen, et al., 2018).
Persistence - The assumption that landowners who participate in incentive programs will
continue the practice once the payments expire (Dayer, Lutter, Sesser, Hickey, & Gardali,
2018).
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
Grasslands are an important ecological and economic resource in Nebraska. These
areas provide income for ranching operations and rural communities, habitat for prairie
plants, animals, and migratory species, and offer non-typical tax revenue for local
governments from activities like tourism and recreation (Vaisley & Strankman, 1999). As
rich fields of species diversity, vast stores of ancient carbon, and strongholds of superior
habitat, the existence of this ecosystem is seen as essential in mitigating the ranging
impacts of a changing climate (Bakker & Higgins 2009; Lark et al., 2019). Yet, the Great
Plains is considered one of the most threatened ecosystems in the world (Hoekstra et al.,
2005).

Figure 1. Changes in grassland acres in the Great Plains ecosystem from 1945-2015. Increases after
1940 correspond to Dust Bowl recovery and declines after 1960 reflect a combination of government
policy and the advancement of center-pivot irrigation. The shaded area represents a period of recordhigh commodity prices and declining enrollment targets for Farm Bill conservation programs. Adapted
from “Modeled Historical Land Use and Land Cover for the Conterminous United States,” by T. Sohl,
R. Reker, M. Bouchard, K. Sayler, J. Dornbierer, S. Wika, R. Quenzer, A. Friesz, 2016, Land Use
Science, 11:4, 476-499.
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In North America, analyses of the Great Plains grasslands (Hoekstra et al., 2005;
Wilsey et al., 2019) indicate that more than 50% has been converted for human uses
(Figure 1). Of the three dominant grassland ecotypes in this region, all have experienced
significant reductions since the government-sponsored settlement of the region began.
The tall-grass ecotype now encompasses only 11% of its historic range, followed next by
mixed grass at 24%, and shortgrass at 54% (Wilsey et al., 2019). The rate of conversion
in remaining tracts of temperate grasslands is occurring five times faster than what can be
protected (Lipsey et al., 2015). The shift in some areas is so vast, one study concluded
that in the late 2000s, it rivaled deforestation rates in the Amazon (Gosnell et al., 2011).
Given these substantial declines, the Great Plains is considered at risk of losing
ecological function (Hoekstra et al. 2005).
Factors Influencing Grassland Conversion
The Northern Great Plains (Nebraska, North and South Dakota, Montana, and
Wyoming) is among areas that have experienced some of the most significant changes in
the past 30 years. Estimates in this region suggest that between 2006-2012, the
conversion of grasslands occurred at 1-5% per year depending on precise location
(Claassen et al. 2012; Wright & Wimberly, 2013). By year-end in 2012, Claassen et al.
(2012) estimated the region accounted for 57% of all domestic grassland to crop
conversion despite encompassing just 16% of the country’s total grassland acres. In their
analysis of regional trends, these researchers concluded producers here were “…far more
likely to convert” grasslands than in other areas of the country (p.46).
While these recent surges in conversion rates are attributed to price increases of
commodity crops such as corn, soybeans, and wheat, the period from 2008-2012 also

13
coincides with the rapid expansion of the ethanol industry and the lowering of enrollment
targets for federal conservation programs (Lark et al., 2020). In totality, these conditions
precipitated the conversion of 53 million acres of Great Plains grasslands (World Wildlife
Fund, 2020) and one of the most significant land-use change events in US history
(Wright & Wimberly, 2013). USDA researchers analyzing the aftermath suggested that
the farm conservation policies enacted alongside economic drivers helped create a
situation that was counterproductive to the goals of grassland conservation (Claassen et
al., 2012).
The relationship between policy and commodity prices during 2008-2012 has
received considerable attention from researchers (e.g., Lark et al., 2019; Wang et al.,
2017; Wright & Wimberly, 2013). These studies suggest the two factors provided strong
incentives for conversion because it effectively lowered an individual’s financial risk. An
analysis of insurance payments from 1994-2013, for example, showed that higher risk
areas received higher net insurance payments than minimal risk counties (U.S. GAO,
2015). Additionally, crop insurance policies in unsuitable areas helped reduce the total
cost of land conversion per acre as some agricultural losses were now guaranteed (Miao
et al., 2016). This arrangement acted as the catalyst in the eventual conversion of 23
million acres of grassland, shrubland, and wetlands during this four-year period from
2008-2011 (Faber et al., 2012).
If commodities served as the boom, then the bust during this period came from
impacts to the natural environment. Chief among them, the loss of avifauna (Green et al.,
2005), accruement of significant carbon debt (Fargione et al., 2008), and the runoff of
millions of pounds of agrichemicals and sediment into waterways (Flynn et al., 2017).
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One recent assessment of pollinator and waterfowl habitat in the Great Plains by Lark et
al. (2020) concluded the pervasive encroachment of cropland into lands of high
conservation value was ongoing, despite the known implications of farming lands that are
marginally productive and have high yield deficits. Continued conversion of grasslands in
the Missouri River Basin, for example, has been projected to release 1.7 trillion gallons
of surface runoff and millions of more pounds of agrichemicals and sediment and serve a
key driver in the extinction of birds (Green et al., 2005)
The financial returns made possible by alternate uses of grasslands will
undoubtedly impact the condition or alteration of the landscape (Rashford et al., 2011).
However, this implies that any action that increases profitability becomes the single
motivation for land-use change (Wang et al., 2017). We find this to be succinct, but not
wholly representative. The agricultural typology literature suggests a variety of factors
(e.g., age of practitioners, declining regional suppliers, competition for water) exist in
livestock ranching—often reinforced by markets and policy—that can bring about the
decisions to convert grasslands (Havstad et al., 2007; Skaggs, 2008; Goldstein, 2011;
Kennedy et al., 2016). Advances in technology have also played an increasingly larger
role. Studies report genetically modified, or hybrid seeds have helped drive an increase in
the amount domestic cropland acres (Wang et al., 2017; Gage et al., 2016). Alterations in
regional climatic patterns are also expected to further intensify land-use conversion
trends in the near future (Broch et al., 2013).
There is a market-based assumption that when commodity prices fall, the amount
of land converted to produce commodity crops also decreases. This is evidenced by
research from Gage et al. (2016), however, the reductions are far more modest in relation
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to the overall grassland conversion rate. While prices fell following the historic highs of
2008-2012, further analysis of grassland acreage suggests that the annual rate of
conversion in the Great Plains stabilized at more than one million acres per year (World
Wildlife Fund, 2020; Lark et al., 2020). While some of the exacerbating conditions have
dissipated since 2012 (e.g., commodity prices, adjustment to Farm Bill policy), Lark et al.
(2019) predict all Great Plains states, regardless of the extent of their remaining
grasslands, are likely to have increased conversion rates in the future relative to their
previous baselines acres.
Conditions in the Livestock Industry
Profitability is undeniably a driving force for land-use conversion, and the top
dollar that was once fetched for corn and soybeans can incentivize landowners to bring
new land into crop production (Rashford et al., 2011; Claassen, 2012; Miao et al., 2016).
While commodity price increases are rightfully accompanied by concerns about grassland
conversion, there is also a unique set of conditions in the livestock industry that are
making it more challenging for ranchers to continue their operations.
Despite relatively high prices for livestock, for example, the rising input costs of
feed, transportation, and equipment (Figure 2) can force an operation to diversify or
outright leave the ranching industry (Gutwein & Goldstein, 2013). If this trend occurs at
scale, a decline in the number of ranchers per capita can have additional negative
economic impacts for the remaining ranching community. For instance, if cropping
systems displace livestock operations, regional suppliers of industry-related services may
close or relocate because of the tipping point between supply and demand (Rowe et al.,
2001). This would likely increase the expenses of the ranch, but it may spill over into
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tenure agreements as rental fees rise alongside competition for high-quality grazing lands
(Gutwein & Goldstein, 2013).
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Figure 2. A graphic representation of economic conditions in Nebraska’s ranching industry based
on USDA Census of Agriculture NAICS economic data from 1987-2007. While the average
producer’s livestock market value has increased, a corresponding increase in the expenditures to
raise these animals has kept pace. Meanwhile, the average rancher’s net cash income has not yet
surpassed $50,000. Adapted from “Census of Agriculture: Nebraska State Level Data 1987 –
2017,” by US Department of Agriculture, 1987-2019.

Other influences on land-use decisions can be more directly attributed to longstanding demographics shifts in rural areas. The availability of qualified individuals to
assist in ranching activities may be reduced as younger generations move and
experienced ranchers reach retirement age (Gale, 2003; Wachenheim & Lesch, 2014).
This may bring some or all lands utilized for grazing into crop production to offset the
workload associated with livestock (Reitsma et al., 2015). Additionally, uncertainty about
operational succession can increase pressure to dissolve a ranch or transition it to produce
other commodities (Toombs et al., 2011). These trends have alarmed even the highest
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policymakers in agriculture who see it as a major loss to both the industry and the
ecosystem services that are provided as public goods (Tauer, 2017).
A particularly unique challenge in agriculture is the fluidity of many internal and
external factors. Our examination of the conservation literature suggests that science,
technology, society, policy, economics, and climatic conditions can all serve as drivers of
land-use change (Gage et al., 2016; Claassen et al., 2012; Goldstein et al., 2011; Wang et
al., 2017). Further, according to Wright and Wimberly (2013), many of these are
occurring simultaneously:
A shift from livestock to corn/soy cropping is consistent with a tipping point at
which increasing rates of return caused by, e.g., rising commodity prices,
subsidized crop insurance, improved corn and soybean cultivars, and adoption of
no-till technologies make grassland conversion more profitable than continued
livestock production (p. 4136).
The lack of economic linkages between grassland ecosystem services and
ranching viability is problematic given the cultural and ecological importance of the
Great Plains ecosystem. While a rancher may be motivated to steward his or her lands to
ensure operational longevity, their business strategy might not align with an ecosystemlevel conservation approach in service of the public interest (Goldstein et al., 2011).
Furthermore, even if there were substantial public support for the protection of privatelyowned grasslands, the economic rationale for taxpayer investments has not been
adequately demonstrated (Bernues et al., 2019).
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Ecological Impacts of Grassland Reduction
Grassland-dependent species like birds help serve as a bellwether for
understanding the implications of a rapidly changing Great Plains ecosystem. In the past
50 years, declines exceeding 50% have been observed in at least eight grassland-bird
populations (Sauer et al., 2014). With et al. (2008) suggest this is underestimated as
population dynamics of birds are unlikely to keep pace with the recent and rapid cropland
expansion event of 2008-2012. This uncoupling of landscape dynamics from population
trends, according to With et al. (2008), suggest that the worst of species declines may not
currently be realized. The delayed feedback makes species recovery efforts challenging
not only because of the difficulty in restoring grassland habitat (Wang et al., 2017), but
because many grassland specialists are known to avoid re-introduced or exotic grasses
(Davis et al., 2013).
There are several other negative ecological effects that result from the conversion
of grasslands to intensive agriculture. As grasslands are removed, associated animal and
plant communities that service soil productivity or pest control will begin to decline
(Foley et al. 2005; Green et al., 2005). Simultaneously, stores of ancient, sequestered
carbon are released (Fargione et al., 2008), soil erosion rates can begin to rise
(Montgomery, 2007), and water quality in absence of buffering and filtration regimes
decreases (Moss, 2008). While the development of croplands from grasslands does come
with modest increases in food production, studies are demonstrating the trade-offs come
at disproportionate and excessive costs to wildlife (Lark et al., 2020), biodiversity, and
water quality (Olimb & Robinson, 2019).
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Turner and Daily (2008) suggest the maintenance of biodiversity, as part of an
ecosystem management strategy, has many characteristics of what society normally
recognizes as public goods (e.g., clean water, pollinator services). Therefore, it is
important to consider, argues Havstad et al. (2007), that grasslands encompass nested
public and private goods. These goods are made available across a host of temporal and
spatial ranges (Turner & Daily, 2008). However, the lack of uptake in managing overall
ecosystem health has left temperate grasslands with the least intact biodiversity of any
habitat type in the world (Newbold et al., 2016). While it is expected that the delivery of
ecosystem services declines in absence of biodiversity, the complexity of these
interactions is not well understood (Mace et al., 2012).
Assessments of biodiversity and heterogeneity can serve as ecological indicators
of ecosystem health. Operationally, according to Li and Reynolds (1995), heterogeneity
can be viewed as a building block of “complexity and/or variability of a system property
in space and/or time” (p. 280). Biodiversity, for its part and according to West (1993), is
an assessment of all these blocks simultaneously in “the variety of organisms, their
genetic differences, and the communities and ecosystems, and landscape patterns in
which they occur” (p. 3). As grassland areas shift to homogenous structures (commodity
crops or introduced forage), both heterogeneity and biodiversity can be expected to
decline. Accompanying these decreases are limitations in the quantity, quality, and
reliability of some services provided to society by healthy grassland ecosystems (Mace et
al., 2012).
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Ecosystem Services Delivery from Grasslands
Because concepts such as biodiversity are often abstract and do not readily lend
themselves to the daily lives of ranchers or the public, a closer examination of the array
of services provided by grassland ecosystems is warranted. The concept of ecosystem
services is described by Daily (1997) as “…the actual life-support functions, such as
cleansing, recycling, and renewal, and they confer many intangible aesthetic and cultural
benefits as well” (p. 3). These functions fall into four broad categories of services:
provisioning, regulating, cultural, and supporting (Goldstein et al., 2011).
The ecosystem services of grasslands (Table 1) vary at vast temporal and spatial
scales (Power, 2010). As a supporting service, this includes nutrient cycling and soil
formation. As a provisioning service, grasslands allow access to fresh water, food, fiber,
and fuel. As a regulatory force, these areas offer pollinator services, maintenance of the
hydrologic cycle, climate mediation, and waste absorption and processing. Lastly,
grasslands serve as important cultural icons for many facets of society—offering
education, aesthetic, spiritual, and recreational opportunities (Skaggs, 2008). In the
delivery of any service, grasslands are dynamic both in the capacity to produce and
deliver the aforementioned goods (Havstad et al., 2007).
The valuation of an ecosystem service rests at the crossroads of sociocultural
motivations for economic and environmental sustainability (Joshi et al., 2019). In the
instance of agriculture, both a necessary and dominant form of land management, it will
both provide and consume ecosystem services (Power, 2010). For example, management
activities may prioritize soil erosion and nutrient retention over the possible extinction of
grassland-dependent species (Yahdjian et al., 2015). In both cases, the provisioning or
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consumption of ecosystem services depends on the management of short-term and longterm objectives (Power, 2010). Determining how to best achieve the co-production of
agricultural goods and ecosystem services through management is of growing and urgent
interest in the grasslands (Boughton et al., 2019)
Table 1. Examples of Ecosystem Services Derived from Grasslands
Ecosystem service

Definition

Examples

Crops

Plants cultivated for humans or
managed animals

Hay, alfalfa, corn, cattle

Livestock

Animals raised for
consumption

Cattle, sheep

Wild foods

Edible plants or animals
harvested from the wild

Elk, deer, antelope

Wood-based

Products made from harvested
trees

Firewood

Other fibers

Products made from non-wood
fibers

Leather, wool

Air quality

Emitting or extracting
chemicals from atmosphere

Fire emits particulates

Carbon sequestration
(climate regulation)

Influence of grasslands on
global climate

Grasses and soils capture
carbon dioxide

Water regulation

Timing and magnitude of water
runoff, flooding, recharge, etc.

Playa lakes recharge aquifers

Water purification

Filtering pollution,
decomposition of waste, etc.

Wetlands filter waste

Erosion regulation

Role vegetation cover plays in
soil retention

Grass prevents soil loss

Disease regulation

Role of grasslands on incidence
of pathogens

Control of mosquitoes

Provisioning
Food

Fiber

Regulating services

Table 1. Examples of ecosystem services derived from grasslands (continued)
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Ecosystem service

Definition

Examples

Crop pollination

Transferring pollen from
female to male flowers

Bees pollinate nearby crops

Pest regulation

Role of ecosystems in
prevalence of pests

Bats consume bugs

Natural hazard regulation

Reducing damage from natural
disasters

Vegetation reduces flood
damage

Recreation

Pleasure derived from outdoor
activities

Hunting, bird watching

Aesthetic and spiritual
values

Inspiration derived from nature

Sense of awe, viewsheds

Cultural services

Maintenance of traditional Role of ecosystems in
lifestyles
supporting traditional ranching
activities

Ranch livestock and
stewardship activities

Research and education

Role ecosystems play in
learning

Rangeland research

Nutrient cycling

Role of ecosystems in nutrient
flow and recycling

Decomposition of organic
matter contributes to fertility

Primary production

Formation of biological
material by plants through
photosynthesis

Algae in wetlands

Water cycling

Flow of water through
ecosystems

Transfer of water from soil to
plants to air, and air to rain

Supporting services

Note. Adapted from “Beef and beyond: Paying for ecosystem services on Western US rangelands,”
by J. H. Goldstein, C. K. Presnall, L. López-Hoffman, G. P Nabhan, R. L. Knight, G.B. Ruyle, and
T.P. Toombs, 2011, Rangelands, 33, p. 6. Copyright 2011 by the Society for Range Management.

Goldstein et al. (2011) suggest that while ranchers do have an inherent interest in
the long-term stewardship of grasslands, the lack of economic linkages to the public
goods that are produced creates inconsistency in the supply and demand of these services.
For example, in absence of market continuity, ranchers need only to consider self-interest
(i.e., earning a living) and may choose to under-provide in core areas that would
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otherwise build on services like biodiversity (Turner & Daily, 2008). Establishing
market-based mechanisms to better account for the unseen, but critical services
grasslands provide is seen as one conceivable way to achieve a balance between
delivering ecosystem services and the production of agricultural goods (Gutwein &
Goldstein, 2013).
Frameworks to Deliver Grassland Ecosystem Services
Because private landowners steward half of the remaining grasslands in the
country, it would seem plausible that declines in grassland acreage are due to a lack of
applicable markets or conservation options. Another explanation may reside in the
frameworks used in conservation or commodity markets. According to Bennett et al.
(2017), one issue is that federal policy and conservation strategies often overlook the
societal conditions from which land alterations arise. While there is an assumption that
federal conservation programs deliver positive social outcomes (Burton et al., 2008),
research in long-term participation and the persistence of incentivized management
activities is notably lacking (Dayer et al., 2018).
Another consideration is that many conservation efforts tend to limit the scope of
management to only the needs of certain species (Greene, 2005). Despite knowledge of
the importance of biodiversity and social/cultural ties to land use, narrow financial
incentive programs are usually offered as the sole solution (Sorice & Donlan, 2015).
Furthermore, stakeholder involvement in the design and implementation of these
programs is usually limited to informal engagement or public commenting processes
(Santo et al., 2015). A participant-focused approach to conservation has been put forth for
consideration but is still largely absent from much of the conservation literature. This
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reflects a belief in the social sciences that human dimension research is not thoroughly
incorporated into the design phase of program development (Sanquist et al., 2010).
Sorice & Donlan (2015) argue that today’s conservation efforts may realize
greater benefits by seeking ways to “explicitly incorporate potential participants’ needs”
(p. 788) into program design. The researchers suggest this approach is better viewed as a
nudge rather than a direct financial incentive. Such an approach not only incorporates
stakeholder feedback, but it allows the design and administration of the program by its
participants to generate more predictable benefits and costs (Santo et al., 2015). This may
lead to greater confidence among participants and non-participants since programs were
developed in a collaborative manner (Sorice & Donlan, 2015). As trust is reported as a
key component in rancher collaborations (Sliwinski et al., 2018), bottom-up approaches
that can offer first-hand accounts of the experience are necessary to increase ranchers’
participation (Kennedy, 2018).
Model: Needs of species or ecosystem service
Incentive Payments Stop

Adopt w Incentives

Producer

Not Adopt with
Incentives

Continue enrollment
(retention)

End enrollment
(dropout)

Continue practice
(persistence)

End practice
(reversion)

Figure 3. Model for persistence in conservation programs. As payments end, non-pecuniary
Dayer, A. A., Lutter, S. H., Sesser, K. A., Hickey, C. M., & Gardali, T. (2018). Private Landowner Conservation
incentives that elicit intrinsically motivated behavior become
more
important
ensure
thePrograms: Recommendations to Facilitate Behavioral
Behavior
Following
Participation into
Voluntary
Incentive
Conservation Letters, 11(2), 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1111/conl.12394
conservation practice is continued. Adapted from “Private Persistence.
Landowner
Conservation Behavior
Following Participation in Voluntary Incentive Programs: Recommendations to Facilitate
Behavioral Persistence,” by A. Dayer, S. Lutter, K. Sesser, C. Hickey, and T. Gardali, 2018,
Conservation Letters, 11, p. 3. Copyright 2018 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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Another design consideration is how incentives (i.e., payments) affect the longterm adoption of conservation practices. Sorice and Donlan (2015) note the overemphasis
on financial incentives stems from a misguided perspective that money is the binding
agent for long-term behavior change (Van Vugt, 2009; Ferraro & Kiss, 2002). A
sustained behavior in this study is referred to as persistence (Figure 3): the continuation
of a practice when financial incentives end (Dayer et al., 2018). Conceptually, persistence
has application to conservation program design as it seeks to produce cost-effective,
long-term conservation outcomes. Within the current body of research, however, the
understanding of how and why landowners engage in conservation practices over time is
lacking (Reimer et al., 2014).
When a participant perceives a conservation program as supportive rather than
controlling, however, the intrinsic motivations of the participant are less likely to be
crowded out (Frey & Jegen, 2001). Behaviors that are internally motivated (i.e., not
directly resulting from compensatory payments) are likely to be sustained over time,
addressing issues regarding cost-effectiveness and persistence of management practices
(Ryan & Deci, 2000; DeCaro & Stokes, 2008). If billions of dollars are to remain
invested in Farm Bill conservation programs (USDA ERS, 2016) it would make fiscal
sense to pursue design considerations that attempt to address behavioral persistence when
the payments end (Dayer et al., 2018).
Emerging Grassland Markets: Payment for Ecosystem Services
In the US, a range of strategies has been used to influence land-use practices. The
first federal programs were aimed to combat Dust Bowl era soil erosion. Later, these
were used to influence market supply and commodity prices. In recent decades, these
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morphed to reduce risk and expand ecosystem conservation (Cain & Lovejoy, 2004). The
latest innovations have sought to integrate private investments, creating market-based
solutions such as carbon trading, wetland banking, and biodiversity credits (Pirard, 2012).
However, two of the largest challenges for grassland conservation have been the adoption
of practices at scale and persistence of management activities beyond the length of the
incentive (Augustine et al., 2019).
The incorporation of market-based instruments to improve conservation outcomes
in grasslands is underway in Wyoming (Hansen et al., 2018), California (Buckley Biggs
et al., 2021), and Colorado (Gutwein & Goldstein, 2013). Payment for ecosystem
services (PES) has been offered as one solution to create more beneficial outcomes for
ranchers’ livelihoods, grassland ecosystems, and for society (Cheatum et al., 2011). PES
programs target a broad array of services that can be managed by private landowners to
enhance the delivery of ecosystem services often considered to be nested public goods
(Garbach et al., 2012). Gutwein and Goldstein (2013) suggest that the creation of these
“environmental markets” may enhance opportunities for land managers to align
operational goals, financial strategies, and conservation outcomes.
PES programs can also be categorized as an environmental subsidy, a policy
intervention, and a commodities exchange rolled into one (Engel et al., 2008). Incentives
offered to landowners, based on conditional delivery of predetermined services and/or the
actions required to deliver those services, are a fixture in PES programs (Hansen et al.,
2018). A unique and important feature of PES, as indicated by Gosnell et al. (2011), is
that the suite of services to be sold follows traditional commodity behavior. Landowners
have equity in the market, allowing them to hold or sell their services at periods of their
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choosing. Normally included are also provisions of “additionality” (services delivered are
higher than they would be in absence of the practice) and “avoided loss” (acreage
reductions are prevented under business-as-usual scenarios (Gutwein & Goldstein, 2013).
PES contracts stipulate the rule-making rights as well as how new practices can
be created or modified. Building in this flexibility not only increases landowner
satisfaction but it also increases program participation (Gosnell et al., 2011).
Additionally, PES contracts are often not individual agreements between buyer and
seller, but by a third-party or cooperative that can better serve the needs of contractual
design and reporting (Gosnell et al., 2011). This has obvious benefits in terms of
aggregating participant impacts for higher rates of return, but it would reduce the
likelihood any one individual can influence a set of management rules or make
modifications (Larson et al., 2010; Wunder, 2013).
There is agreement that sound natural resource management accounts for past and
present ecologic function, human influences, and a basic understanding of the socioeconomic values of the system to be managed (Dietz et al., 2003; Berkes & Turner, 2006;
Hayes et al., 2014). However, less attention is given to the role local knowledge and
preferences should play in the design of conservation policy or programs (Clements et al.,
2010; Petheram & Campbell, 2010) An important distinction of PES programs is that
stakeholders can engage at various levels of the process. Using collaborative processes
can assist in debunking the notion that conservation is incongruent with agriculture and
can lead to increased participation (Sorice et al., 2011). In this respect, PES may be more
advantageous than similar programs as it can build social capital by paying for results
landowners help devise (Burton et al. 2008). When programs can balance improving
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participant livelihoods with the rulemaking and compliance of conservation programs,
resource managers are more likely to adopt practices to sustain the resource system
(Persha et al., 2011; Hellin & Schrader, 2003; Schlager & Ostrom, 1992).
Even when programmatic design and participation are in alignment, adoption may
be limited if there is an inability to make program modifications at an individual level
(Cheatum et al., 2011; Hayes et al., 2014; Hansen et al., 2018). One solution utilized by
Ostrom (1990) for communally managed systems, was to propose a set of design
principles utilized in other successful programming, then allow for stakeholders to make
and modify these when establishing a program framework. This, according to Hayes et al.
(2014) is consistent with findings on why resource managers are more likely to adopt
new management practices or sustain existing ones.
If mutually beneficial outcomes in conservation are to be achieved, Hayes et al.
(2014) also note the sociocultural drivers of land-use conversion should receive robust
consideration. The assumption that a direct economic incentive alone, facilitated through
a conditionality clause, will be a sufficient pro-environmental response may not be
wholly accurate when we examine the total area of grasslands that are converted each
year. Studies in ranching have shown that family, tradition, lifestyle, connection to the
land, and amenity values are strong motivations for ranching (Gutwein & Goldstein,
2013; Havstad et al., 2007; Gosnell & Travis, 2005). Additional research has also shown
that while profitability is a factor, is not necessarily the primary driver for decisions in
ranching (Smith & Martin, 1972; Gentner & Tanaka, 2002).
The true potential of PES, according to Toombs et al. (2011), is that these
payments could establish a new asset class that binds wealth to services provided from
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healthy grasslands through sustainable livestock ranching. Because ranchers engage in
rearing livestock for several reasons, conservation policy that relies on the imperfect
assumption that a practitioner's motivations are exclusively driven by economic selfinterest is likely to overlook opportunities for behavioral persistence and increased
participation (Sorice & Donlan, 2015).
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
This study conducted an ex-ante conjoint choice experiment to measure Nebraska
ranchers’ preferences for attributes commonly found in payment for ecosystem programs
(PES). For the purposes of this research, “ranchers” refer to cattle producers who own or
rent native grassland in the state. Our research was informed by the work of Hansen et al.
(2018) who focused on PES with ranchers in Wyoming. Ranchers for this study were
recruited through a variety of traditional and nontraditional methods due to the COVID19 pandemic and health safety protocols. Accordingly, the survey was only available to
participants through an online survey platform.
Limitations to in-person gatherings increased our reliance on stakeholder-based
organizations such as the Nebraska Cattlemen Association to assist with rancher
recruitment for the study. Based on their membership information, we sent invitations to
participate in the survey through email, text, and postcards to ranchers operating cow/calf
pairs in the state (n=1,548) during two outreach attempts. Additionally, we procured a
mailing list from a third-party vendor to send postcard invitations directly to ranchers.
Parameters of ranchers engaged in cow/calf operations, on improved pasture or
grasslands, of at least 50 acres or more (n=5,743) were selected. These individuals
received two postcards (one invitation, one reminder) requesting their participation in the
study. We also disseminated invitations for participation through social media, electronic
newsletters, and media outlets. With the outreach information that was quantifiable, we
determined our study sample to represent 7,291 ranchers in Nebraska.
Limits to in-person gatherings led us to forego all attempts at face-to-face data
collection. Our survey was made available only through an online survey platform
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(Qualtrics) for a duration of 8-weeks. Our objective was to reach ranchers operating in
Nebraska, with various levels of expertise, and different operational capacities. However,
determining rancher typology from the limited information we could gather was a
challenge. Therefore, we found it appropriate to examine known demographic
information about ranchers in Nebraska based on the USDA’s (2019) Census of
Agriculture, using the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) standard.
This system is the federal statistical standard by which agencies such as the USDA
classify a variety of industries, including many of those involved in agriculture.
Using techniques outlined in conjoint choice research, we quantified choice set
data to assess marketplace behavior regarding rancher acceptance of PES program
attributes. Conjoint choice experiments (CCE), related to conjoint analysis according to
Yong (2004), can be traced to random utility theory, discrete choice analysis, and choice
modeling. CCE differs from conjoint analysis in that it directly elicits respondent
preferences in an effort to better understand the complexities of how products are valued
(Louviere & Woodworth, 1983). CCE is sometimes referred to as a discrete choice
experiment, but there are noteworthy differences described in the literature. A closer
review of these techniques can be found in Louviere et al. (2010).
Attributes in this research refer to the variables that encompass the structural
makeup of each hypothetical PES choice set. Study participants were tasked with
evaluating a series of choice sets and selecting the most preferred alternative. This
allowed us to quantify the perceived value of each attribute with the resulting data
informing its “utility” (Yong, 2004). Utility refers to an attribute’s relative worth, which
can be expressed numerically. Low values indicate low utility and high values represent
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increased utility. These utilities are useful for conducting preference simulations,
revealing an overall preference share for a PES attribute among study participants. We
find this to be one of the primary advantages of CCE as the utility reflects “trade-offs”
participants must make when formulating decisions that will affect their ranching
operations (Yong, 2004).
The variables that were tested in the hypothetical PES programs were based on
the structure of those found in USDA conservation programs. Offerings such as the
Conservation Stewardship Program are contractual, encompassing a management
activity, compensatory payment, and a length of time for which the arrangement is valid
(US GAO, 2007). The contract length and payment level attributes used were based on
the model study and our feasibility analysis with ranchers, natural resource professionals,
and farm policy experts. The management attributes we tested were derived from
recommendations put forth in the state’s wildlife management plan: the Nebraska Natural
Legacy Project (Schneider et al., 2011).
Table 2. Choice Combinations Based on Contract, Payment, and Management Attributes
Attribute

Variables tested

Contract length (years)
Payment levels (dollars/acre)
Management actions
Total

5, 10, 20
5, 25, 50, 100, 250, 500
16 total (see Table 4)
288

Note. Contract variables for length (3) and year (6) were adapted from offerings currently found in Farm
Bill conservation programs. The variables (16) tested for the management attribute were adapted from the
Nebraska Natural Legacy Project (Schneider et al., 2011). This resulted in a total of 288 possible choice
combinations.

The resulting attributes and variables (Table 2) in aggregate consisted of 288
choice combinations that were possible (16 management; 6 payment levels; 3 contract
lengths). Because of this, we utilized an incomplete confounded factorial design to arrive
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at the choice sets for testing. A common challenge with CCE, one that we address
through incomplete confounded factorial methodology, is it asks participants to rate the
entirety of attributes present. In this case, reviewing all 288 program profiles would result
in survey fatigue and the emergence of bias in a rancher’s selection (Yong et al., 2010).
An incomplete factorial design allows us to narrow the total number of profiles presented
to a participant, while still testing the main effects of management, payment length,
contract duration, and lower order interactions among the three. This technique allows us
to elicit responses that are free from subject effect (Kanmongne & Eskridge, 2013).
Survey respondents were assigned to review the choice sets in one factorial array
(i.e., block) as a side-by-side comparison of two program profiles. This study examined
128 choice combinations that were represented across eight factorial blocks. These eight
blocks were constructed to ensure an even distribution of data across the experiment,
allowing us the ability to examine how the three attributes affected participant choices.
Within each block, subjects were presented with eight choice sets in which to select their
preferred program offering. If a subject did not prefer either program or was unsure about
their intentions regarding a choice set, they could select neither.
Participants were also asked a brief series of demographic questions (Table 3) to
obtain baseline information about respondents and relative locations in the state. For our
purposes, ranchers of all experience levels and operational classifications were of
interest. However, one screening question was included to allow those not involved in
cattle ranching to self-select out of the survey. As previously discussed, incomplete
confounded factorial designs are not conducive to a full estimation of treatment
interactions and effects. However, as our interest was narrowly focused on the
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significance of payment levels, contract lengths, and management actions on preferences,
we did not examine correlations of these demographic variables on the programmatic
variables we selected for testing.
Table 3. Demographic Questions Posed to Survey Respondents
Questions
Which best
describes your
grazing
operation?

Which zip
code(s) are most
of these lands
located?

How many years
have you raised
and managed
grazing animals?

How would you
describe the acres
your animals
graze on?

How many acres
are involved in
your grazing
activities?

Note. To address survey fatigue and anticipated low response rates, this study was narrow in the
demographic information collected. These questions were developed through our feasibility
analysis within the ranching and natural resources communities.

A noteworthy difference between this research and the model study was in the
management attributes that were tested. Hansen et al. (2018) feasibility analysis drew
upon direct consultation with various stakeholders in a targeted study area. For this
research, which sought to establish a baseline for management across a much larger
geographic region (the state of Nebraska), we adopted management strategies that already
received considerable stakeholder review from the Nebraska Natural Legacy Project
(NNLP). Of additional relevance was NNLP’s emphasis on accentuating biodiversity, a
key indicator on the delivery of ecosystem services (Mace et al., 2012; Freese et al.,
2014; Goldstein et al., 2011).
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Table 4. Nebraska Natural Legacy Project’s Conservation Actions to Address Barriers to
Conservation and Stresses Affecting Species and Habitats
Actions Related to Fire
1.

For select grasslands, use patch-burn grazing and other grazing systems that combine the
interaction of fire and grazing to mimic pre-settlement disturbances.

Actions Related to Grazing/Haying
2.

3.

4.

5.
6.

Use diverse grazing/haying systems on private and public lands that enhance biological
diversity and sustain natural communities. Initiate research that evaluates the effectiveness
and profitability of biological diversity-friendly grazing/haying systems (e.g., reduced
stocking rates, rotational systems).
Develop and distribute a “best management practices” guide on grazing that can be used to
improve management of grasslands and riparian areas for biological diversity. Include
information on sources of technical information, funding programs, wildlife-friendly
fencing specifications, etc.
Support diverse haying strategies (e.g., on wet meadows) that stagger timing and height of
cutting, promote increased plant and animal diversity, and avoid peak nesting periods for
grassland birds.
Promote the use and availability of locally adapted native seed sources for pasture and
rangeland seedings.
Promote livestock grazing/haying systems that have built-in drought management
contingencies (e.g., grass banking).

Actions Related to Hydrology
7.

Promote and provide incentives for the use of wildlife-friendly conservation buffers,
grassed waterways, sediment traps, etc. on lands adjacent to wetlands, rivers, streams,
reservoirs, and lakes to prevent siltation and protect water quality.
8. Promote the development and use of water conservation measures such as more waterefficient irrigation systems, xeriscape landscaping, water-conserving appliances, etc.
9. Use and promote restoration and management techniques that utilize native, locally adapted
species whenever possible. Discourage the use of non-native species in
restoration/management projects. Encourage private seed companies to provide localecotype seed and harvesting and planting services.
10. Renovate aquatic habitats by removing introduced rough fish to improve water quality,
enhance aquatic vegetation and increase biological diversity. | Seek measures that prevent
the introduction, breeding, and use of potentially invasive non-native species by nurseries,
hatcheries, universities, etc.
Actions Needed to Reduce Habitat Fragmentation

11. Discourage the placement of woody plantings and food plots within natural grassland
communities, especially when it will result in increased fragmentation.
12. Provide incentives to private landowners to maintain natural habitats and to cooperatively
manage large blocks of habitat as complexes that conserve biological diversity.
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13. Seek to remove or create bypass structures around dams and other impediments that restrict
the natural movement of aquatic species.
Actions Needed to Reduce the Impacts of Pollution
14. Promote the practice of integrated pest management (e.g., non-chemical controls such as
biocontrol and tillage, spot spraying) through outreach and incentives to minimize impacts
to biological diversity.
15. Implement and seek funding for conservation practices such as filter strips, grassed
waterways, sediment control basins, and grassed buffers to minimize the effects of
fertilizers and pesticides on wetlands, streams, rivers, and reservoirs.
16. Work with agricultural and conservation partners to prioritize installation of conservation
buffers, conservation tillage practices, etc. within watersheds where benefits to biological
diversity would be highest.
17. Promote management practices that limit the impacts of nutrients, sedimentation, bacteria,
and pesticides to help protect water quality. Examples include nutrient application on
cropland, sediment control on construction sites, incentives for organic farming and lowchemical farming, etc.
Note. Only 16 of the 17 management recommendations were tested as two closely related variables
were combined to reduce the total number of choice sets. Adapted from “The Nebraska Natural Legacy
Project: State Wildlife Action Plan,” by R. Schneider, K. Stoner, G. Steinauer, M. Panella, and M.
Humpert, 2011.

The statistical analysis that was employed in this study is based on McFadden’s
(1974) utility model of consumer choice. This was modified to include the random block
effects where each respondent is randomly assigned to one and only one block
(Kanmongne & Eskridge, 2013). Specifically, the consumer choice utility is described as:
Uijkl = vijkl + εijkl
where:
Uijkl = the utility to subject l who chooses alternative (profile) i in choice-set j
within block k;
Vijkl = the predictor component of the utility; and
Εijkl = the residual component.
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Here the predictor vijkl is linear in the parameters and to account for correlation among
responses within subjects, it is expressed as a mixed-effect model:
vijkl = x’ijkl β + Z’ijkl u
where:
x’ijkl = a vector of attribute levels,
β = a vector of parameter coefficients for the fixed effects,
Z’ijkl = a classification vector for the random effects, and
u = a vector of random subject effects.
Since the choices are multinomial (choice 1 or 2 or neither), a multinomial logit link
function with the base as the "neither" category (C) will be used as the response of which
the predictor was a mixed linear model with the factors as the fixed effects and the blocks
as the random effects. Specifically,
Logit (pijkl / pcjkl ) = vijkl = x’ijkl β + Z’ijkl u
where pijkl = is the probability that an alternative (profile) i in choice-set j within
fraction k is chosen by a random subject l.
The logit model above is a generalized linear mixed model and was fit with SAS
Proc Glimmix to test for main effects and first-order interactions of the attributes. See
Kanmogne and Eskridge (2013) for more details on the statistical analyses of confounded
factorial conjoint choice experiments.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND FINDINGS
Using NAICS (North American Industry Classification System) estimates
referenced in the USDA’s (2019) Census of Agriculture, our sample population
constituted 63% of the 11,551 ranches engaged in cattle production on grasslands in
Nebraska. Over the 8-week survey period, we registered 251 completed surveys from
producers—a 3.5% response rate of our study’s sample population. Our geographic
assessment (Figure 3) shows respondents were primarily operating in north-central
Nebraska (Sandhills region), one of the largest contiguous grasslands in the Great Plains.
In comparison to NAICS data about Nebraska’s ranchers, we found our sample
population to be reflective of many of the core demographic characteristics outlined. For
example, across categories such as ownership, total acres grazed, type of grazing, and
average experience, we find the responses in our sample to mirror statewide trends. For
example, 52% of participants reported owning grazing lands utilized in their operation
with 77% having more than 20 years of experience. NAICS survey data indicates that
54% of ranchers reported owning the lands they grazed and 74% had 11+ years of
experience. In comparing the type of lands grazed, we find similar trends with survey
78% of respondents reporting they grazed rangeland compared to 84% of those in the
NAICS survey.
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Figure 4. Locations where ranchers had grazing animals, reported by zip code. Up to five zip codes
per rancher were allowed.

Ranchers self-identified across many of the demographic classifications that were
presented (Table 5). A majority of ranchers in this study reported having 20+ years of
experience (77%) while conducting their ranching activities on native grasslands (78%).
There was a mix in ownership type with 52% reporting they owned the land they grazed,
and 33% reporting they utilized a combination of ownership and rentals to manage their
herds. No participants utilized grazing allotments on federal or state land, mirroring the
larger trend of private land ownership in Nebraska. Additionally, producers represented
many different operational capacities. Approximately 48% of ranchers reported they
utilized 1,000 acres or more and 88% of all respondents were involved in activities on
>100 acres.
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Table 5. Demographic Comparison of Nebraska Ranchers Using PES Survey Responses
and USDA NAICS’ Standard
Characteristic
(PES Study)

Ranchers
(n = 251)

Experience (years)
0-5
6-10
11-20
20+

6.0
7.0
9.2
77.0

52.8
14.0
33.0

12.6
12.9
74.5

Own
Part owner
Tenant

54.3
32.2
13.5

Grazing type
78.6
1.0
3.4

Ranch by size (acres)
0 to 5
6 to 20
21 to 50
51 to 100
101 to 200
201 to 500
501 to 1,000
1,000+

0-5
6-10
11+
Land ownership

Grazing type
Grassland
Improved pasture
Pastured
forestland/other

Ranchers
(n = 11,551)

Experience (years)

Land ownership
Own
Tenant
Combination

Characteristic (NAICS
Standard)

Pasture or rangeland
Pastured
forestland/other

84.9
0.97

Ranch by size (acres)
1.8
1.3
3.6
5.5
9.1
20.6
14.2
47.7

0 to 9
10 to 49
50 to 69
70 to 99
100 to 139
140 to 179
180 to 219
220 to 259
260 to 499
500 to 999
1,000 to 1,999
2000 +

0.97
16.0
3.6
5.3
5.0
5.3
3.2
2.5
11.9
11.3
9.3
17.0

Note. Data represented as a percentage share of total unless otherwise noted. USDA Census (2019) data
utilizes NAICS beef cattle ranching and farming standard. Some classifications differ based on parameter
assessments used by the respective studies.

Our experimental model detected an indifference for many of the attributes and
variables that were tested. Management attributes, however, were found to have a highly
significant effect (p<0.0001) on respondents’ preferences for a given program (Table 6).
This was observed in Type III tests of fixed effects where preference share of
management, payment, length, and the combination of the latter two were examined. In
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an analysis of payment levels and contract lengths, neither had a significant effect on the
respondent’s preference for the choice sets that were presented. This indicates there was a
level of indifference to every individual payment or contract attribute regarding
participation in our grassland payment for ecosystem services program.
Table 6. Fixed Effects Tests of Management, Payment, Contract, and Interactions
Attribute
Management
Payment
Contract length
Payment & length

Degrees of
freedom

F-Value

Pr > F

15
5
2
10

12.34
0.70
0.28
1.65

<.0001
0.6197
0.7540
0.0866

Note. Management actions as an attribute class were found to have significant effects on the rancher
preferences for any given choice set. Treatment effects considered significant at p< .05.

In the broader context of the 16 management practices tested, 61% of participants
preferred management actions that were tied to practices known to improve biological
diversity such as reduced stocking rate, rotational grazing, stockpiling (Table 7).
Conversely, the least preferred practices were related to the management of water
resources on the ranch. Approximately 8% of respondents suggested they were willing to
remove structures that restricted water movement or remove species or vegetation that
had been introduced. Further, participants did not appear to have strong interests in
reducing nutrient or insecticide applications to improve water quality (21.97%).
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Table 7. Ranchers’ Preferences for Management Actions as Part of PES Program
Offering
Management action

Estimate

Standard
error

T Value

Mean
% Share
(n=251)

Standard
error
mean

Use a grazing practice to improve biodiversity

-0.4859

0.1030

-4.72

61.52

.06337

Use grazing/haying systems with built-in
drought management

-0.8611

0.1168

-7.37

42.27

.04936

Utilize native, locally adapted species in
restoration/management projects

-0.8789

0.1412

-6.23

41.52

.05863

Use a combination of grazing and prescribed fire
to benefit wildlife or habitat

-0.8946

0.1200

-7.46

40.88

.04905

Remove or discontinue woody plantings within
grasslands or improved pasture

-0.9198

0.1130

-8.14

39.86

.04503

Use adapted native seed sources for pasture and
grassland seeding

-1.0427

0.1256

-8.30

35.25

.04428

Incorporate wildlife-friendly fencing in
grasslands and riparian areas

-1.2461

0.1371

-9.09

28.76

.03944

Manage grasslands in cooperation with other
large blocks of habitat to conserve wildlife

-1.2468

0.1484

-8.40

28.74

.04264

Stagger timing or height of haying to increase
plant and animal diversity

-1.4220

0.1400

-10.16

24.12

.03376

Practice integrated pest management to enhance
biodiversity

-1.4559

0.1546

-9.42

23.32

.03605

Upgrade or install water conservation measures

-1.5097

0.1457

-10.36

22.10

.03220

Reduce nutrient and insecticide applications to
protect water quality

-1.5154

0.1519

-9.98

21.97

.03337

Implement filter strips, grassed waterways, etc.
to minimize the effects of fertilizers and
pesticides on wetlands and waterways

-1.7263

0.1635

-10.56

17.79

.02910

Incorporate wildlife-friendly conservation
buffers for waterways to prevent siltation

-1.7858

0.1633

-10.94

16.77

.02738

Remove structures that restrict the natural
movement of aquatic species

-2.4792

0.2379

-10.42

8.381

.01994

Remove introduced “rough fish” or aquatic
vegetation to improve water quality

-2.4913

0.2260

-11.02

8.28

.01872

Note. Least squares means converted to percentage share. A mean value near 33.0 would demonstrate
indifference for a given attribute variable. Verbiage presented here was condensed for ease of display.
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In an examination of lower-order interactions among contract length and payment
level, we did not detect significance among these attribute classes or the variables that
were tested (Table 8). Additionally, no specific themes about program configurations
were apparent (i.e., low payment, short contract length). A leading trend among ranchers
in this study was the use of high payments and longer lengths, however, these preferences
were not statistically significant among the ranchers we surveyed.
Table 8. Lower Order Interactions Among Payment, Contract Length, and Combination
Characteristic

Standard
error

DF

T Value

Estimate

Mean
(n=251)

Standard
Error
Mean

-1.5536
-1.7095
-1.6468
-1.5202
-1.6247
-1.5671

0.1343
0.1433
0.1342
0.1354
0.1378
0.1593

3613
3613
3613
3613
3613
3613

-11.57
-11.93
-12.27
-11.23
-11.79
-9.84

0.2115
0.1810
0.1927
0.2187
0.1970
0.2087

0.02840
0.02592
0.02585
0.02961
0.02714
0.03324

-1.6431
-1.5819
-1.5858

0.1233
0.1238
0.1239

3613
3613
3613

-13.32
-12.78
-12.80

0.1934
0.2056
0.2056

0.02385
0.02546
0.02538

-1.5431
-1.5354
-1.5822
-1.9399
-1.4543
-1.7342
-1.6341
-1.5777
-1.7286
-1.5186
-1.4189
-1.6231
-1.4886
-1.9635
-1.4218
-1.7343
-1.5418
-1.4250

0.1709
0.1689
0.1679
0.1819
0.1711
0.2213
0.1710
0.1815
0.1701
0.1594
0.1832
0.1953
0.1581
0.1976
0.1751
0.2168
0.1831
0.1978

3613
3613
3613
3613
3613
3613
3613
3613
3613
3613
3613
3613
3613
3613
3613
3613
3613
3613

-9.03
-9.09
-9.42
-10.67
-8.50
-7.84
-9.56
-8.69
-10.16
-9.53
-7.75
-8.31
-9.41
-9.94
-8.12
-8.00
-8.42
-7.21

0.2137
0.2154
0.2055
0.1437
0.2336
0.1765
0.1951
0.2064
0.1775
0.2190
0.2420
0.1973
0.2257
0.1404
0.2413
0.1765
0.2140
0.2405

0.03652
0.03637
0.03450
0.02614
0.03996
0.03906
0.03337
0.03747
0.03021
0.03492
0.04433
0.03854
0.03569
0.02773
0.04224
0.03828
0.03919
0.04756

Payment (dollars)
5
25
50
100
250
500
Contract length (years)
5
10
20
Payment and Length
$5 per acre for 5 years
$5 per acre for 10 years
$5 per acre for 20 years
$25per acre for 5 years
$25 per acre for 10 years
$25 per acre for 20 years
$50 per acre for 5 years
$50 per acre for 10 years
$50 per acre for 20 years
$100 per acre for 5 years
$100 per acre for 10 years
$100 per acre for 20 years
$250 per acre for 5 years
$250 per acre for 10 years
$250 per acre for 20 years
$500 per acre for 5 years
$500 per acre for 10 years
$500 per acre for 20 years

Note. Pr > |t| = <.0001. Least squares means results based on the experimental model. A mean value near
>.33 demonstrates indifference for a given level of an attribute. No variables within payment, contract
length, or a combination of the two attributes were significant preferences among ranchers in this study.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND RESEARCH NEEDS
Ranchers must account for a growing number of influences if they are to remain
successful in the livestock industry. Grassland conservation programs are no different.
Government policy, commodity markets, information networks, technology
advancements, and other factors may all contribute to a rancher’s decision to convert
native grasslands to alternative uses. However, our study suggests that the significance of
financial incentives used to influence those decisions may be overemphasized.
Few in the livestock or natural resources sectors would argue that compensatory
payments are not enticing features to offer ranchers engaged in conservation. However,
what we found in the literature and confirmed in our study was its importance may be
overstated. In the attributes we tested–management, contract length, and payment level–
only management variables were found to have significant effects on a rancher’s
preference for any given payment for ecosystem services (PES) program. This finding
was similarly evidenced in the model study by Hansen et al. (2018), where ranchers selfreported that the nature of the management action and its intended outcomes were of
higher importance than the payment level.
Analysis of the relationships among contract lengths and payment levels also
yielded no conclusive evidence of the importance to ranchers who participated. Together,
these findings suggest the need to offer conservation programs that reflect the challenges
of cattle ranching in a natural grassland system. This might also indicate, as the literature
confirms, that creating participant flexibility in any program offering is an important
design consideration.
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This research also provides important clues in how conservation programs can be
developed and discussed with ranchers moving forward. For example, using biodiversity
both as a metric and a tool for private land conservation. What we discovered is that of all
16 management actions we tested, using grazing to conserve biodiversity was preferred
over all other possible program options. This suggests not only that biodiversity is a
recognized term within Nebraska’s ranching community, but it also indicates ranchers see
biodiversity as a management strategy that can coexist with the core business of livestock
production.
In a closer examination of the least preferred management actions, we found the
lowest to all to be related to the management of water. This is problematic given water’s
importance in agriculture, conservation, and society. Because our work shows that
biodiversity is becoming more familiar conceptually within the ranching community, a
conservation program offering like PES might look for more ways to specifically address
biodiversity needs in relation to aquatic resource management. For example, rather than
consultations on individual impaired species, it may be more effective to highlight the
overall net decline of the aquatic ecosystem and what these declines tell us about water
quality and landscape health.
It is important to note that there will also be trade-offs to consider in relation to
ecosystem service production. For example, raising livestock as a provisioning service
may at times conflict with others like pest regulation or pollinator services. To be
successful, detection and monitoring must be rigorous to ensure the supply of ecosystem
services remains constant and is not prioritized for the delivery of any single service. Not
only do these programs need to achieve the measurable conservation and delivery of
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ecosystem services, but these programs need to enhance profitability and demonstrate
congruency with ranching lifestyles.
Our review of the literature also sheds light on the need for PES and other
conservation programs to create more intentional feedback loops with ranchers. Local
participation and decision-making ability are particularly attractive to ranchers, but
notably absent in many of today’s conservation offerings (Donlan, 2015). A robust PES
program would incorporate stakeholder involvement at several levels (i.e., program
design, price negotiations, satisfaction surveys, etc.). This approach mirrors principles
laid out in human-centered design and persistence frameworks, ensuring those charged
with stewarding natural resources are also protected with technology transfer, financial
investment, and localized decision-making ability. With these elements present in the
correct proportion, programmatic satisfaction will remain high and bring about the best
possibility of behavioral persistence if the option to participate in PES markets remains
constant.
The success of a PES program will in part be based on the ability to first meet the
needs of livestock producers, then align with other conservation outcomes, and conclude
the arrangement with the eventual sale of the ecosystem service (Hansen et al., 2018). In
any phase, these programs will see additional benefits by emphasizing ranchers' roles as
ecosystem stewards, educating the public and other landowners about the services and
marketing opportunities that healthy grasslands provide (Gutwein & Goldstein, 2013). In
some cases, PES programs will need to align with pre-existing arrangements or even be
started from scratch (Engel et al., 2008). In every situation, programmatic offerings must
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possess an understanding of local dynamics and support a rancher’s freedom of choice in
conjunction with their quality of life (Sorice & Donlan, 2015).
Shortcomings of PES Application
There are several concerns about the real-world application of PES programs.
There is a philosophical debate: the potential of ecosystems to be engineered for only the
most profitable/beneficial services (Redford & Adams, 2009). There are critiques of
relevance, ensuring program design and implementation are a net gain for a rancher’s
bottom line (Didier & Brunson, 2004). There are also questions about fairness and
profiteering among the ecosystem service sellers, suggesting that “someone’s getting rich
off of [ranchers]” (Gosnell et al., 2011, p. 23). Conversely, a publicly-funded approach
may create the perception that PES programs are a social safety net for ranchers (Gutwein
& Goldstein, 2013). Further yet, there are several examples in the US and abroad where
conservation programs were designed in ways that did little to ensure that conservation of
species or resources would occur (Wunder, 2006).
Another area of concern surrounds the integration of money and policy. Research
has noted that while financial incentives can increase the adoption of a new practice, it
does not always lead to the retention of the technique when payments end. Hayes et al.
(2014) point to interdisciplinary studies in psychology, agricultural policy, and
economics that show directly incentivized conservation can produce short-term gains that
may be followed by unintended, long-term consequences (Cardenas et al., 2000; Hellin &
Schrader, 2003; Grothmann & Patt, 2005; Vignola et al., 2010). For example, without
careful compliance measures, revenue generated from a PES program may create the
financial flexibility to invest in agricultural expansion in other areas when the payments
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end (Goh & Yanosky, 2016). Even more extreme, Engle et al. (2008) point to instances
where PES participants engaged in environmentally destructive management to qualify
for higher payments later.
Incentive-based conservation is also believed to usher in phenomena such as
motivation crowding. This exists when a practitioner’s intrinsic motivations to act on
behalf of a common good are “crowded-out” because it is believed sufficient
compensation is not in place to justify the effort (Frey & Jegen, 2001). Incentives,
therefore, model the notion that self-interest is the appropriate action in place of prosocial
behavior (Cardenas et al., 2000). Bénabou and Tirole (2003) note incentives are also
thought to compromise the role of self-determination, thus making intrinsic motivators no
longer necessary. Further, they suggest, a perception may arise that if incentives are
needed to perform a task, the activity itself is inherently negative.
There are also structural critiques of PES programs that deserve consideration.
Several of these apply because of the large geographical areas grasslands cover. A fallacy
of composition becomes an adding-up problem, suggesting what works in one area may
not work at other temporal or spatial scales (Skaggs, 2008). Additionally, there are
substantial complexities to quantify and verify things like soil carbon sequestration across
the spectrum of program participants (Gosnell et al., 2011). “Free-riding” is also believed
to occur, wherein some individuals will benefit from the goods produced despite not
participating or fully paying the costs that led to its provision (Obeng et al., 2018). In a
grassland PES program, the suite of commodities produced and the interactions between
them will be difficult to truly ascertain (e.g., biodiversity). This may further increase
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motivations to free-ride as the number of buyers of any single ecosystem service increase
(Gosnell et al., 2011).
With a conservation effort as large as a domestic grassland PES program, there
will be a necessity to streamline and maximize efficiencies. However, institutional
approaches often are bureaucratic and make participation cumbersome (Gutwein &
Goldstein, 2013). For example, in instances of a localized drought, the inability to modify
a contractual arrangement could have lasting repercussions to the producer’s financial
objectives and the integrity of the managed resource. Because ranching is closely tied to
the natural environment, programs that fail to address the need for increased flexibility
may remain unpopular (Kennedy et al., 2016). Furthermore, ranchers are often opinion
leaders in rural communities, and a negative experience could quickly enter local
information exchanges and affect program adoption (Gosnell et al., 2011).
Limitations of the Research
A limitation to this research was undoubtedly the medium for which it was
distributed. Based on conditions originating from directive health measures and COVID19, we chose to move the entirety of this survey online. Previous research with ranchers
often carries low response rates (Kennedy, 2018; Sliwinski, 2018; Troy et al., 2005).
However, our 3.5% response rate likely reflects that the survey was only available in one
medium. While we believe certain inferences can be made based on USDA (2019)
Census Data, it is problematic to project these findings to all of Nebraska’s ranching
operations.
There are also limited applications of this research when examining the
relationships that may exist among the management, payment, and contract length
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variables that were tested. As we sought to explore baseline preferences for
programmatic structure, we intentionally used a methodology that allowed us to test a
wide range of attributes. This provided us an opportunity to explore lower-order
interactions, which we believe will be useful for researchers continuing to explore the
feasibility of PES programs in Nebraska’s grasslands. However, we would urge caution
in drawing definitive conclusions about any one specific attribute variable.
Opportunities for Future Research
We believe there are an array of contributions that others can make to further the
research of PES programs in Nebraska. First, we find it logical to continue research in
this field with practitioners who operate working ranches and are currently engaged in
conservation stewardship. Building on studies surrounding ranchers’ perceptions of
biodiversity and innovation (Sliwinski et al., 2018; Kennedy et al., 2016), an effort to
create the sociological framework that moves a PES concept to a human-designed
conservation program is a critical need.
Another area of need surrounds the creation of the collaborative trust networks
that are inherent to successful PES programs. We believe this can be accomplished
through securing research funding, which is part of a leveraged approach to assist
ranchers with developing pilot locations statewide. These sites, similar to other sites used
for technology transfer, should be equipped to serve as the first information exchanges
among potential program participants. These sites need to be accessible, replicable and
bring together the cadre of entities that will be needed to make PES successful.
The third and largest need will come from the understanding of how to establish
the market-based instruments that will lead to PES adoption. This research will need to
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cover areas of ecosystem service delivery, monitoring, and compliance, as well as how to
market these services in a manner that resembles a commodities market exchange.
Furthermore, because healthy grasslands exemplify diversity and complexity, it would
only make sense for future research to embody an interdisciplinary approach that bridges
natural-world capital with land manager motivations.
Conclusion
As livestock producers attempt to navigate shifting consumer preferences, rising
input costs, and turbulent trade relationships, ranchers may be ready for alternative
options that can diversify revenue streams and support their quality of life. If that can
come from the marketing of non-traditional commodities such as ecosystem services
remains to be seen. However, our research shows there is an appetite among ranchers to
manage for goals such as biodiversity conservation. Given biodiversity’s importance to
the health and productivity of grasslands, this has promising implications for future
conservation partnerships with ranchers.
Entities interested in grassland conservation may note this research did not find
evidence of a statistical relationship between management actions and the
compensatory/contract attributes. This suggests that current and future conservation
efforts may benefit from allocating more resources to develop programs in consultation
with ranchers (i.e., human-centered design), and rely less so on the financial incentives.
Furthermore, conservation programs that assist producers with marketing their livestock
products as compatible and supportive for wildlife, clean air, and water will find a larger
market share among an increasingly urbanized public. If this can be accomplished
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through sound management and product marketing, creating the additional economic link
to supplying an array of ecosystem services could be within reach.
At the surface, PES programs appear to be a dramatic overhaul to current
grassland conservation efforts. While PES seeks out innovation and alternative
frameworks (e.g., practitioner-orientated, biodiversity conservation), it is important to
recognize that there are already mechanisms in place that compensate ranchers for
ecosystem services (e.g., protection of water resources). Furthermore, if federal funding
and the resulting acres targeted for grassland conservation continue to decline, a new
generation of conservation programs must emerge if the full suite of ecosystem services
provided by healthy grasslands are to be maintained on the Great Plains. Given the
sustained declines to grasslands, it may not be prudent to assume ranchers can or should
provide these public benefits without some sort of incentive structure.
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Dear Participant,
Researchers at the Institute of Agriculture and Natural Resources at the University of
Nebraska-Lincoln are collecting information in order to understand Nebraska ranchers’
preferences for the design and implementation of grassland conservation programs. The
results of this study will help us create a program that will provide economic links
between ranching viability and maximum public and ecological benefit.
This web survey is short and should only take about 10-15 minutes to
complete. To access the survey online, please go to the link listed below
go.unl.edu/grasslands
The information you provide will be kept confidential and only be used for the research
purposes of this project. All results will be reported so that no individual can be
identified. Your participation is voluntary but greatly appreciated, and you may skip any
questions you prefer not to answer. There are no known risks to participating in this
survey, and you can refuse to participate at any time without harming your relationship
with the University of Nebraska. There are no direct benefits to
participation, though your feedback will help develop a grassland conservation program
that benefits both the environment and Nebraska ranchers like you.
If you have any questions about the survey, please do not hesitate to contact Kyle
Martens who is conducting this survey at 402-472-2660 or kmartens3@unl.edu If you
have questions about your rights as a participant, please contact the UNL Institutional
Review Board at 402-472-6965 or irb@unl.edu.
Survey link: go.unl.edu/grasslands
Thank you for your time,
Kyle Martens,
Graduate Student and Researcher
School of Natural Resources, University of Nebraska - Lincoln
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Nebraska’s grasslands are an important ecological and economic resource for Nebraska.
These areas provide ranching families with an income, a connection to the land and are
often closely tied to family tradition. These lands also provide important habitat for
prairie plants, animals, and migratory waterfowl. Despite the many benefits these intact
grasslands provide, conversion to other land uses remains common throughout much of
the remaining Great Plains grasslands.
Numerous incentives for the conservation of “goods and services” exist for grasslands in
the United States. Direct payments for the conservation of these resources are popular
among some ranching families. However, in Nebraska, the need for technical and
financial incentives to do conservation work is growing and is outpacing the ability to
meet demand.
An emerging conservation program that may potentially fill this void is called payment
for ecosystem services, or PES. These PES programs assess landowner stewardship
practices; identify nontraditional goods produced such as clean water, reduced soil
erosion, or wildlife habitat; and then market and sell these goods. Potential buyers often
include energy companies aiming to offset their production or development activities,
state or local governments seeking to maintain water quality, and nonprofits interested in
species conservation.
Contracts for PES are voluntary and function like other programs, such as conservation
stewardship program (CSP). One core difference is that PES programs can be leveraged
alongside CSP, providing more operating income for ranchers. Additionally, neighbors
can form cooperatives pooling their goods together to gain a higher price.
This study seeks to understand what preferences Nebraska grassland managers have for
conservation programs. You will be presented with a series two management options
with an associated payment level and contract length are presented. Please select which
option is the most attractive or select neither.
The information you provide will be kept confidential and only be used for the research
purposes of this project. All results will be reported so that no individual can be
identified. Your participation is voluntary but greatly appreciated, and you may skip any
questions you prefer not to answer. There are no known risks to participating in this
survey, and you can refuse to participate at any time without harming your relationship
with the University of Nebraska. There are no direct benefits to
participation, though your feedback will help develop a grassland conservation program
that benefits both the environment and Nebraska ranchers like you.
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